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bstract
Using data for 1238 banks located in 94 developing and emerging countries, we explore whether the impact of bank regulation and supervision on
anking risk (measured by the banks’ Z-scores) depends on bank structure. Our findings suggest that stricter regulation and supervision increases
he banks’ Z-scores. Notably capital requirements and supervisory control diminish banking risk. However, the effectiveness of other dimensions
f regulation and supervision depends on the organizational structure of banks. Notably activity restrictions reduce risk of large and foreign owned
anks, while liquidity restrictions have most effect on the Z-scores of unlisted and commercial banks. 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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literature on the impact of bank regulation and supervision on
banking risk is whether the impact of regulation and supervision
on financial stability varies among different types of banks.2eywords: Financial risk; Bank regulation and supervision; Bank structure; De
.  Introduction
Although it is widely believed that stricter bank regulation
nd supervision will enhance the resilience of the financial sec-
or, empirical evidence on the relationship between regulation
nd supervision and financial stability is mixed. For instance,
emirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) fail to find a signifi-
ant relationship between countries’ compliance with the Core
rinciples for Effective Bank Supervision as issued by the Basel
ommittee on Banking Supervision (BCPs1) and banking risk
 The views expressed are those of the authors and they do not necessarily
eflect the position of De Nederlandsche Bank.
∗ Corresponding author at: Wageningen University, Development Economics
roup, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands.
E-mail address: jeroen.klomp@wur.nl (J. Klomp).
1 Also several other studies have used compliance with the BCPs to proxy
ank regulation and supervision (Sundararajan et al., 2001; Das et al., 2005;
odpiera, 2006 and Demirgüc¸-Kunt et al., 2008). However, compliance with
he BCPs is mostly classified information. Several studies (including Pasiouras
t al., 2006; Fonseca and González, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011) therefore employ
Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
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879-9337/© 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Aing countries
s measured by the Z-score. In contrast, using measures of bank
egulation and supervision drawn from a World Bank survey,
lomp and de Haan (2012) report that regulation and supervi-
ion do not have much effect on low-risk banks, but have a highly
ignificant effect on high-risk banks.
Most studies on the impact of bank regulation and supervi-
ion on banks’ behavior focus on industrialized countries (cf.
elis and Staikouras, 2011; Klomp and de Haan, 2012) or use
 sample of advanced and emerging countries (cf. González,
005; Barth et al., 2013). However, in recent years some studies
ave been published that examine the impact of bank regulation
nd supervision on banking risk in non-industrialized countries
cf. Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011; Klomp and de Haan, 2014).
One important issue that has received scant attention in thehe World Bank survey on supervision to construct measures of bank regulation
nd supervision (cf. Barth et al., 2008).
2 Exceptions are the studies by Laeven and Levine (2009) and Klomp and de
aan (2012). For their sample of 250 privately owned banks across 48 countries
aeven and Valencia (2008) report that the relation between risk and regulation
ll rights reserved.
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data to compute proxies for bank regulation and supervision.J. Klomp, J. de Haan / Review of 
ore specifically: does bank structure (i.e. bank ownership,
ize, activities, and funding) affect the impact of regulation and
upervision on banking risk? In this paper we expand the anal-
ses of Klomp and de Haan (2012, 2014) and examine to what
xtent bank structure matters for the impact of bank regulation
nd supervision on banking risk using a sample of 1238 banks
ocated in 94 developing and emerging countries. As pointed out
y Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), these countries are very dif-
erent in terms of financial and institutional development from
dvanced countries.
Several previous studies suggest that bank structure matters
or bank behavior. For instance, the results of Saunders et al.
1990) suggest that stockholder controlled banks in the US have
tronger incentives to take higher risk than managerially con-
rolled banks and that these differences in risk become more
ronounced in periods of deregulation. In addition, based on a
ample of about 1000 banks in 133 non-industrial countries De
icoló and Loukoianova (2007) conclude that there are large dif-
erences in the risk profiles of banks depending on their owner-
hip. Foreign banks take more risk compared to their domestic
ompetitors. The findings for the German banking market of
ltunbas et al. (2001) suggest that public and mutual banks have
ost and profit advantages over their private sector competitors.
urthermore, for a set of European banks Lepetit et al. (2008)
how that banking risk is mostly located in small banks and is
aused by commission and fee generating activities. The findings
f Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) indicate that an expan-
ion into non-interest income-generating activities increases the
ate of return on assets (ROA), while wholesale funding lowers
he ROA. If bank structure affects bank behavior, the impact of
ank regulation and supervision may differ across banks.
We analyze whether the structure of the supervised bank
ffects the impact of regulation and supervision on banking
isk. Following previous studies (cf. Laeven and Levine, 2009;
emirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 2011) we employ the Z-score,
hich reflects the number of standard deviations that a bank’s
eturn on assets has to drop below its expected value before
quity is depleted and the bank is insolvent, as a proxy for bank-
ng risk. We examine whether ownership (private vs. government
wnership; domestic vs. foreign ownership), riskiness and size
f the bank matter. Likewise, we analyze whether banking risk
f listed and unlisted banks are affected in the same way by bank
egulation and supervision.
To explore these issues, we apply a three-stage approach.
n the first stage of our analysis, we use the survey data of
arth et al. (2004b, 2008) to compute our proxies for bank reg-
lation and supervision. Following Pasiouras et al. (2006), we
onstruct seven measures: (1) capital regulations; (2) regulations
n private monitoring; (3) regulations on activities restrictions;
4) supervisory control; (5) deposit insurer’s power; (6) liquid-
ty regulations, and (7) market entry regulations, respectively.
epends on each bank’s ownership concentration. For their sample of 200 banks
n 21 advanced countries Klomp and de Haan (2012) examine whether the impact
f regulation and supervision depends on similar bank structure characteristics
s considered here.
T
v
A
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hopment Finance 5 (2015) 82–90 83
n the second stage of our analysis, we use a dynamic panel
odel to estimate the relationship between banking risk and
ank regulation and supervision. To address potential endogene-
ty problems we estimate our models by system-GMM. Finally,
e split our sample in different subsamples according to partic-
lar bank structure characteristics, such as ownership, size, and
iskiness. This allows us to draw inferences about the importance
f these bank characteristics on the effectiveness of supervision
nd regulation.
Our findings suggest that stricter banking regulation and
upervision decreases banking risk. In particular, we find that
apital requirements and supervisory control are negatively
elated to the risk of almost every kind of bank. The effec-
iveness of other types of regulation and supervision depends
n bank structure. For instance, regulations concerning activity
estrictions reduce risk at large and foreign owned banks, while
iquidity restrictions have most effect on risk of unlisted and
ommercial banks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next
ection introduces our proxies for bank regulation and supervi-
ion and describes the methodology and other data used. Section
 presents the estimation results for the effect of bank regulation
nd supervision on banking risk and the role of bank structure
herein. The final section concludes.
.  Data  and  methodology
.1.  Banking  risk  and  regulation3
Our largest sample consists of sample of 1238 banks
ocated in 94 developing and emerging countries (see
able A1 in the online Appendix for the number of banks in each
ountry). We measure banking risk by the Z-score. The Z-score
ndicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return
n assets has to drop below its expected value before equity is
epleted and the bank is insolvent (see Roy, 1952; Hannan and
anweck, 1988; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; De Nicolo, 2000).
hus, a higher Z-score indicates that a bank is less fragile. If
rofits follow a normal distribution, it can be shown that the Z-
core measures the distance-to-default. The data on the Z-score
s taken from Bankscope of Bureau van Dijk. As Fig. 1 shows,
he average Z-score is quite stable in the period of analysis for
merging markets, while for developing countries it increases
ver time.
Barth et al. (2004b, 2008) collected detailed and comprehen-
ive information on bank regulation and supervision for more
han 107 countries between 1999 and 2008.4 We use this surveyhe survey consists of 175 questions on regulation and super-
ision of commercial banks. Following Pasiouras et al. (2006),
3 This section draws on Klomp and de Haan (2012, 2014).
4 Due to missing data not all countries could be included. See Table
1 in the online appendix for the list countries. This table also shows
he classification of countries based on information provided by the IMF
ttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/02/index.htm.
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the financial system, for example, by affecting the solvency
of borrowers, by increasing uncertainty, or by unexpected and
excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk. In addition, weig. 1. Z-score, 2002–2008. This figure shows the average Z-score for banks
ocated in emerging and developing countries, respectively. Banks are weighted
y size of their balance sheets.
e classify the survey questions used into seven groups: (1)
apital regulations; (2) regulations on private monitoring; (3)
egulations on activities restrictions; (4) supervisory control; (5)
eposit insurer’s power; (6) liquidity regulations, and (7) mar-
et entry regulations. Table A2 in the online appendix shows
he (classification of the) questions of the survey included in our
nalysis, as well as their variation. In constructing our regulation
nd supervision variables, we use principle components analysis
PCA) to the questions used to construct our measures of bank
egulation and supervision. PCA produces a factor score with
ean zero and standard deviation one. An advantage of this
ethod is that individual questions used in constructing each
easure are not equally weighted. The correlations between
ur proxies for regulation and supervision range between −0.12
nd 0.37 indicating that the various measures capture different
imensions of the regulatory framework.
.2.  Empirical  model
This section presents our model used to estimate the relation-
hip between banking regulation and supervision and the banks’
-score. We estimate a dynamic model based on an unbalanced
anel including 1238 banks from 94 developing and emerging
ountries between 2002 and 2008. The model is:
 ln(1 +  Zscore)ijt =  αij +  ηt +  μ  ln(1 +  Zscore)ijt−1
+  βjxkijt−1 +  γ  regulationjt−1 +  εijt
(1)
here Zscoreit is the Z-score of bank i  in country j at time t.
ollowing Demirgüc¸-Kunt et al. (2008), we use the logarith-
ic of (1 + Zscore) to smooth out higher values of the Z-score
nd avoid losing observations with a dependent variable of zero.
e include the lagged level of ln (1 + Zscore) to control for
uto-regressive tendencies. The vector xk is a vector of (lagged)
ontrol variables containing k elements, while regulation  repre-
ents our proxies for (lagged) bank regulation and supervision
t the national level as outlined above. The parameter αij is a
ank-specific intercept. Using bank specific-intercepts places iopment Finance 5 (2015) 82–90
he emphasis for identification on the within bank variation over
ime. This approach reduces the influence of any potential selec-
ion bias that might arise. Finally, the time fixed effects ηt capture
nobservable periods’ characteristics that are country and bank
nvariant, such as a global crisis, while εijt is the error term.
Our hypothesis is that the Z-score increases due to stricter
ank regulation and supervision (γ > 0). One could argue that
ank regulations do not change not exogenously. For instance,
he occurrence of a banking crisis may lead to more rigorous
egulation and supervision. When we fail to explicitly control
or these factors, our results might be spurious. Addressing the
otential endogeneity problem formally, we start by using the
eneralized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed
y Arellano and Bond (1991). In this approach, the endogeneity
roblem is dealt with by estimating an instrumental regression
or the first-difference equation using the second and higher-
rder lags of the endogenous and dependent variables and
he first-difference of the exogenous variables as instruments
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Bond et al., 2001).
This approach, however, has some serious drawbacks. First,
ifferencing the equation removes the long-run cross-country
nformation present in the levels of the variables. Second, if
he independent variables display persistence over time, their
agged levels will be poor instruments for their differences. How-
ver, under additional assumptions, it is possible to construct
n alternative GMM estimator that overcomes these problems.
pecifically, more moment conditions are available if we assume
hat the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the indi-
idual effects (Arellano and Bover, 1995). In this case, lagged
ifferences of these variables and of the dependent variable may
lso be valid instruments for the levels equation. The estimation
hen combines the set of moment conditions available for the
rst-differenced equations with the additional moment condi-
ions implied for the levels equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998).6
s long as the model is over-identified, validity of the assump-
ions underlying both the difference and the system estimators
an be tested through the Sargan test of orthogonality between
he instruments and the residuals and through tests of second-
r higher order residual autocorrelation.7 We correct the bias
sing the finite sample correction of the two-step covariance
atrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).
We include control variables suggested by previous stud-
es on banking risk (cf. Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998;
aminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Klomp and de Haan, 2012; Delis
nd Staikouras, 2011). First, we control for macroeconomic fac-
ors: inflation, economic growth, changes in the exchange rate,
xternal debt, current account balance, and shocks to the terms
f trade (see also Beck et al., 2006). Adverse macroeconomic
hocks affecting the economy will increase the instability of6 See also Durlauf et al. (2005).
7 Specifically, we use the GMM estimator implemented by Roodman (2006)
n Stata, including Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction.
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The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the valid-J. Klomp, J. de Haan / Review of 
nclude GDP per capita to control for differences in economic
evelopment. Furthermore, we include two dummy variables
aking the value one in case of a debt crisis or currency crisis
n a particular country-year as banking risk arguably increases
uring financial crises (source: Laeven and Valencia, 2008).8
According to Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), high
eal short-term interest rates affect bank balance sheets adversely
f banks cannot increase their lending rates quickly enough and
ence increase banking risk. In addition, large capital inflows
nd capital flight may affect the stability of the financial sector.
e therefore control for the net financial flows, and the ratio
f M2 to foreign exchange reserves. The fiscal balance (as a
ercentage of GDP) affects the government’ room for maneuver
or intervening in a banking crisis through recapitalization and
ationalization operations.
Not only the economic situation matters for financial sound-
ess but also the institutional environment within a country.
ountries lacking a sound legal system and good governance
ight have weaker banks due to corruption or inefficient
nforcement of law and government ineffectiveness (La Porta
t al., 1998; Levine, 1998; Barth et al., 2004a; Fernandez and
onzález, 2005). To capture institutional quality within a coun-
ry, we include a measure based on the first principal component
f the six governance indicators of Kaufmann et al. (2009): voice
nd accountability, political instability and violence, govern-
ent effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control
f corruption.
Next, we include a measure to capture financial liberaliza-
ion. Improperly implemented financial liberalization is likely to
ause banking crises as financial institutions are allowed more
pportunities for risk-taking in a liberalized financial system
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In contrast, proper financial
iberalization may reduce default risk of banks due to more
pportunities to diversify their risk. We measure financial lib-
ralization by the first principal component of the indicators of
redit controls, interest rate controls, capital account restrictions,
nd security market policies taken from Abiad et al. (2008).9
ikewise, we include the growth rate of the domestic credit
upplied to the private sector. A credit boom together with
mproperly liberalized financial markets often leads to a sys-
emic banking crisis. In addition, we add the credit-to-GDP to
easure the financial depth of the banking system in a country.
Furthermore, we control for bank market concentration as
e Nicoló et al. (2004) find that highly concentrated banking
ystems exhibit higher levels of systemic risk. In addition, based
n Dreher (2006), we include a dummy variable taking the value
ne if in a particular year a country received financial assistance
rom the IMF. Improving the health of the financial sector is
requently part of the adjustment program that comes with IMF
upport.
8 We do not include banking crises as these are arguably driven by the same
ariable as the Z-score.
9 Our measures for liberalization, institutional quality and our dimensions of
ank regulation and supervision may be related, but the correlation coefficients
o not suggest multicollinearity problems.
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Finally, we include several bank-specific control variables.
irst, Shehzad et al. (2010) find that ownership concentration
ignificantly affects loan quality and bank capitalization. We
herefore include a dummy variable taking the value one if a
ank has a shareholder who owns more than 25% of the bank
oncerned. We also include dummies reflecting government or
oreign ownership. Likewise, we control for listed vs. unlisted
anks.
Second, to capture that the banks included in our sample differ
n their activities, we include a dummy to separate investment
anks and commercial banks. Third, we use the natural logarithm
f real total assets to control for the impact of the size of a bank.
ourth, we include the number of subsidiaries as a proxy for
iversification and business franchise power. Finally, we include
wo dummy variables capturing whether a bank failed or merged
n a specific year.
Table A3 in the online appendix provides an overview of all
ariables, their definitions and source as well as their descriptive
tatistics.
.  Empirical  results
This section presents the estimation results for the effect
f bank regulation and supervision on banking risk using the
ystem-GMM estimator.10 Unlike most previous studies, we
onsider a very long list of potential control variables. All these
ariables make sense from a theoretical perspective. However,
ue to reasons of data availability, using all suggested control
ariables in one specification would reduce our dataset dra-
atically thereby increasing the risk of sample selection bias.
e therefore selected our set of control variables by applying
he general-to-specific method. This method does not rely on
conomic theory, but is a widely used method in applied econo-
etrics to decide on model specification (see Hendry, 1993). We
rst estimate a model including all control variables as outlined
n the previous section, but without including our proxies for
ank regulation and supervision. Next, we drop the least sig-
ificant variable and estimate the model again. We repeat this
rocedure until only variables that are significant at the 10%
evel remain.11 In view of the unequal distribution of the num-
er of banks within a country, we cluster the standard errors at
he bank level to obtain consistent standard errors. For example,
ur sample contains 25 banks from Russia, while it only con-
ains 1 bank from Gabon or Cameroon. We use the jackknife
stimator with 1000 replications to obtain consistent standardty of the instruments. To address this issue we consider two
10 Specifically, we use the GMM estimator suggested by Roodman (2006) in
tata.
11 The complete results of the general-to-specific approach are available upon
equest. A potential problem with this approach is that the sample may change
n each step due to data availability. However, we prefer this approach to ad hoc
pecifications as usually applied in previous studies. The specification of our
ase model that resulted from the general-to-specific approach also makes sense
n view of models used in previous studies.
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pecification tests. The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying
estrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by
nalyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in
he estimation process. The second test examines the hypothesis
hat the error term εijt is not serially correlated. The Sargan test
rovides no evidence of misspecification, while the serial cor-
elation tests point to first- but no second-order autocorrelation
f the residuals, which is in accordance with the assumptions
nderlying the selection of instruments.
The general-to-specific procedure (excluding bank regulation
nd supervision) yields a number of significant variables that we
elect for our xk vector. Using this approach, we are left with
238 banks. The estimation results for this baseline model as
hown in column (1) of Table 1 indicate that financially more
eveloped systems are more fragile. One explanation is that in
ountries with more developed financial systems, banks may
rovide too much credit to the private sector leading to over-
nvestment in high-risk projects. In more detail, when the ratio
etween credit and GDP increases by one-percentage-point the
-score is reduced by 0.1%. Real GDP per capita affects the
-score in the opposite direction. This is in line with the find-
ngs of previous studies such as Podpiera (2006). It turns out
hat a more open economy, measured by the contribution of
rade to GDP, makes the financial sector more resilient as these
ountries are better able to absorb adverse shocks through their
mports and exports. Furthermore, we find that countries with
etter institutions have a healthier banking system as they suffer
ess from corruption or bureaucracy and have a better juridi-
al system. This is in line with the results of Demirgüc¸-Kunt
nd Detragiache (1998) and Fernandez and González (2005).
inally, our results suggest that bigger banks are less risky as
hey might be better able to diversify their activities or a have a
ore diversified loan portfolio.12
Next, we subsequently add our proxies for bank regulation
nd supervision to the baseline model.13 We start by including
ur aggregate measure of regulation and supervision, which is
he average of the (standardized) seven measures of bank regu-
ation and supervision as described in Section 2.1.14 The results
s shown in column (2) of Table 1 suggest that stricter regu-
ation and supervision significantly decreases banking risk. An
ncrease of 1% of our aggregate measure of bank regulation and
upervision decreases banking risk by 0.57%.
As the effect of each of the seven dimensions of bank reg-
lation and supervision may be different (Klomp and de Haan,
012), we add these measures subsequently to the baseline spec-
fication. The results suggest that capital regulation significantly
ecreases banking risk (column 3 in Table 1). A 1% increase in
12 Table A4 in the online appendix shows the pairwise correlation between
he control variables employed in our main regressions, while Table A5 gives a
etailed summary of the control variables per country.
13 If we take up the regulation and supervision variables directly into the
eneral-to-specific approach, the results (available on request) are very simi-
ar. This indicates that a potential country sample selection bias is no major
oncern affecting our conclusions.
14 Using the first principal component of the seven indicators of bank regulation
nd supervision instead of the average gives similar results (available on request).
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he level of capital regulation decreases banking risk by 0.86% at
he 5% significance level. This finding is in line with the results
eported by Agoraki et al. (2011) and Barth et al. (2004a) who
nd a significant negative impact of capital regulation on the
hare of non-performing loans and the onset of a banking crisis.
ikewise, Laeven and Levine (2009) conclude that stricter cap-
tal requirements increase the distance-to-default, while Klomp
nd de Haan (2012, 2014) demonstrate that adequate capital reg-
lation is one of the most effective ways to restrain banking risk.
n contrast, Beck et al. (2006) and Delis and Staikouras (2011)
o not find evidence that capital regulations reduce the fragility
f the banking system, measured by the occurrence of a banking
risis or the distance-to default.
Next, we include our proxy for regulations on private mon-
toring. The results indicate that this type of regulation has no
ignificant effect on banking risk (column 4 in Table 1). This
esult is in line with the findings of Klomp and de Haan (2012),
ut Barth et al. (2004a, 2001) and Agoraki et al. (2011) find that
he share of non-performing loans decreases when there is more
rivate monitoring present. One explanation for our result is that
symmetric information may be more pronounced in our sam-
le of non-industrialized economies. This information problem
akes private monitoring less effective.
Also regulations on restricting bank activities do not reduce
anking risk (column 5 in Table 1). This result confirms the
iew that restrictions on bank activities do not necessarily reduce
nancial fragility (cf. Barth et al., 2004a; Agoraki et al., 2011).
eck et al. (2006) even report that activity restrictions increase
he likelihood of a banking crisis due to limiting the opportunities
o diversify risk. In contrast, Delis and Staikouras (2011) find that
he distance-to-default is reduced by regulation limiting bank
ctivities. One potential explanation for our result is that banks
n emerging and developing countries may be less involved in
ore complex banking activities.
Our results suggest that supervisory control significantly
educes banking risk (column 6 in Table 1). If the level of
upervisory control increases by 1%, banking risk decreases by
.4%. In contrast, Barth et al. (2001) find a significant positive
mpact on financial fragility of supervisory power using a panel
ncluding industrialized and transition countries. However, when
ransition countries are excluded, these authors do no longer find
 significant effect of supervisory power.
In line with Klomp and de Haan (2014), we do not find a
ignificant effect of regulations on deposit insurance on the level
f banking risk (column 7 in Table 1). One explanation is that
 deposit insurance system influences bank soundness in two
pposite ways (Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). On the
ne hand, bank runs are less likely to occur when deposits are
nsured. On the other hand, a deposit insurance system provides
anks incentives to engage in more risk-taking.15 Apparently,
15 Anginer et al. (2013) examine the relation between deposit insurance and
anking risk in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis.
hey find that generous financial safety nets increase banking risk in the years
eading up to the global financial crisis, but during the crisis banking risk is
ower.
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Table 1
Baseline model.
Dependent variable:  ln [1 + Zscore]
Baseline Overall Capital
regulations
Regulations on
private
monitoring
Regulations on
activities
restrictions
Supervisory
control
Deposit
insurer’s
power
Liquidity
regulations
Market entry
regulations
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Lagged dependent
variable
−0.393** −0.375** −0.346** −0.377** −0.444** −0.452** −0.411** −0.362** −0.361**
[0.03] [0.032] [0.036] [0.032] [0.034] [0.035] [0.036] [0.029] [0.031]
Real GDP per capita 0.146* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146*
[0.08] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078]
Private credit −0.099** −0.099** −0.099** −0.099** −0.099** −0.099** −0.099** −0.099** −0.099**
[0.03] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Trade 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114**
[0.05] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053]
Institutional quality 0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 0.045*
[0.03] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Asset size −0.138* −0.138* −0.138* −0.138* −0.138* −0.138* −0.138* −0.138* −0.138*
[0.07] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071]
Regulation and
supervision
0.057** 0.085** 0.009 0.001 0.035** 0.012 0.034 0.027
0.028 0.030 0.010 0.001 0.015 0.009 0.025 0.022
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Estimation method System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM
Observations 4987 4987 4987 4987 4987 4987 4987 4987 4987
Hansen test p-value 0.324 0.352 0.316 0.314 0.356 0.314 0.294 0.337 0.321
Arelanno-Bond
AR[1] p-value
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arelanno-Bond
AR[2] p-value
0.599 0.628 0.649 0.559 0.623 0.546 0.658 0.617 0.627
Sargan test [p-value] 0.311 0.341 0.301 0.315 0.327 0.327 0.312 0.297 0.307
Column (1) shows the outcomes of the general to specific approach, using all the control variables discussed in the main text, but not including our measures for bank regulation and supervision. The next columns
show the result if some measure of bank regulation and supervision is added to the model shown in column (1). **/* indicates significance levels of 5 and 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
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Table 2
Bank structure I.
Listed Unlisted Government owned Private owned Foreign owned Domestic owned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall index 0.041** 0.079** 0.048** 0.068** 0.032* 0.071**
[0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Capital regulations 0.066** 0.142** 0.090** 0.101** 0.049** 0.093**
[0.03] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Regulations on private monitoring 0.058* 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.008
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Regulations on activities restrictions 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.012* 0.001
[0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Supervisory control 0.027** 0.055** 0.040** 0.038** 0.018** 0.030*
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
Deposit insurer’s power 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.011
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Liquidity regulations 0.025 0.051* 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.039
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Market entry regulations 0.011 0.015 0.024 0.028 0.051* 0.028
[0.01] [v0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
The table shows the results for different subsamples, which are determined using certain bank characteristics, such as listed vs. unlisted banks (columns 1–2),
ownership (private vs. government ownership) (columns 3–4) and foreign vs. domestic ownership (columns 5–6). The model is estimated including the control
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iariables as shown in column (1) of Table 1. The dependent variable is  ln (1
evels of 5 and 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthe
he opposing effects of a deposit insurance scheme on banking
isk cancel out.
Finally, we do not find a significant effect of liquidity restric-
ions (column 8) or market entry regulations (column 9 in
able 1) on banking risk. The latter result contradicts the conclu-
ion of Barth et al. (2004a) that a higher score on the ‘entry into
ank requirements index’ increases the likelihood of a banking
risis.
To sum up, we find that stricter regulation and supervision
as a significant impact on banking risk but not all dimensions
f regulation and supervision matter. Notably capital regulation
nd supervisory control have a negative effect on banking risk.
lso Klomp and de Haan (2014) find that only capital regulation
nd strict supervision are effective in restraining banking risk in
merging markets and developing countries.
An important question to which we turn now is whether bank
tructure characteristics affect the impact of bank regulation and
upervision on banking risk. The effect of bank regulation and
upervision on banking risk may differ across various types of
anks. Our approach is to split the total sample into subsamples
ased on relevant bank characteristics.16 We split our sample as
ollows: listed vs. non-listed banks, banks with public ownership
s. banks with private ownership, and banks with foreign vs.
omestic ownership.17
First, we examine whether the effectiveness of regulation is
ifferent for banks listed at the stock exchange and for non-
isted banks. As columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 indicate, we find
hat not only capital regulation and supervisory control but also
16 Alternatively one may use a threshold regression as suggested by Hansen
2000). In our case the splits are made on an exogenous group classification
nstead of a dynamic threshold.
17 The p-value of the AR(2) tests in Table 3 and (4) ranges between 0.276 to
.651, while the p-value of the Sargan test ranges between 0.209 and 0.541.
s
h
a
d
l
t
t
tore). The model is estimated using system GMM. **/* indicates significance
egulations on private monitoring reduce risk for listed banks,
hile liquidity regulations have a significant impact on unlisted
anks. These results can be explained as follows. As listed banks
ave to deal with shareholders regulation on private monitor-
ng becomes more important. As non-listed banks do not have
he opportunity to raise capital on the stock market, capital and
iquidity regulations may matter more for these banks.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 present the results for banks
here the government owns more than 50% of the shares and
anks that are privately held, respectively. The results indicate
hat regulation and supervision have a similar impact on both
ypes of banks. This is in contrast to Barth et al. (2004a) who
nd that regulation of government-owned banks is less effective.
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 the sample is split into for-
ign and domestic owned banks. The results suggest, based on
he size of the coefficients, that capital regulation and supervi-
ory control are less effective for foreign banks. These findings
robably reflect that these banks may rely on their parent bank
or capital. Activity restrictions and market entry regulations
ostly affect foreign owned bank as they usually try to compete
ith new banking activities in the host country.
In the next sample split, shown in columns (1) and (2) of
able 3, we distinguish between investment and commercial
anks. About 10% of the banks considered in our sample are
dentified as investment bank. The impact of regulation and
upervision may differ between these types of banks since they
ave a different business model with different clients, activities
nd funding possibilities. The results demonstrate that the main
ifference between these banks can be found for the impact of
iquidity regulations which only affect investment banks.
In the next sample split we group banks in accordance with
heir asset size since large banks have potentially more oppor-
unities to diversify risk. We split the sample in banks with a
otal asset value of more 90 billion US dollar and banks with
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Table 3
Bank structure II.
Commercial banks Investment banks Small banks Large banks High-risk Low-risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall index 0.047* 0.062** 0.059* 0.059** 0.098* 0.055**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
Capital regulations 0.045** 0.098** 0.151** 0.075** 0.192** 0.068**
[0.02] [0.03] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] [0.02]
Regulations on private monitoring 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Regulations on activities restrictions 0.011 0.031 0.001 0.010* 0.001 0.001
[0.02] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Supervisory control 0.039** 0.031* 0.030** 0.038* 0.070** 0.030*
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01]
Deposit insurer’s power 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.010
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Liquidity regulations 0.026 0.065** 0.074** 0.035 0.073** 0.023
[0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.02]
Market entry regulations 0.019 0.041 0.022 0.023* 0.031 0.029
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
The table shows the results for different subsamples, which are determined using certain bank characteristics, such as commercial vs. investment banks (columns
1–2), small vs. large banks (columns 3–4) and the riskiness of a bank (columns 5–6). The model is estimated including the control variables as shown in column (1)
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2f Table 1. The dependent variable is  ln (1 + Zscore). The model is estimated
obust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
 total asset value below 90 billion US dollar.18 The results in
olumns (3) and (4) of Table 3 reveal that capital and liquid-
ty regulation are more important in reducing banking risk of
mall banks. One explanation is that small banks may face more
ifficulties in attracting capital and liquidity than large banks.
arket entry and activity regulations restrict risks of large banks
he most. This is not surprising as large banks often have more
iverse activities and are operating in multiple countries which
ay increase their risk-taking if they are not constrained by
egulations.
Finally, Klomp and de Haan (2012) argue that the impact of
nancial regulation and supervision on banking risk is condi-
ional on the level of banking risk. That is, the impact of stricter
egulation and supervision is larger for banks with a high level
f risk than for banks with a low level of risk. In columns (5)
nd (6) in Table 3 we therefore divide the sample into two
ubsamples based on the median level of banking risk in the
eriod 2002–2008. The estimation results confirm the findings
f Klomp and de Haan (2012). The impact of regulation and
upervision related to capital adequacy and liquidity on banking
isk is on average about 1.5 times higher for high-risk banks than
or low-risk banks.
.  ConclusionsThe aim of this paper is to analyze whether the relationship
etween regulation and supervision and banking risk depends
n bank structure. We use the data provided by Barth et al.
18 This is the median size of the banks in our sample over the entire sample
eriod. As a robustness test we also performed this sample split using the 10%
argest banks measured by their asset size as our ‘large banks’ subsample and
he remaining banks as our ‘small banks’ subsample. The qualitative results
available on request) do not differ from the ones presented in the main text.
R
A
A
Ag system GMM. **/* indicates significance levels of 5 and 10%, respectively.
2004b, 2008) to construct seven measures of bank regula-
ion and supervision and use the Z-score as proxy for banking
isk. Our database consists of 1238 banks in 94 non-industrial
ountries in the 2002–2008 period. To address potential endo-
eneity problems we estimate our models by system-GMM.
Our findings suggest that stricter bank regulation and super-
ision increases the Z-score. Notably capital requirements and
upervisory control reduce the risk of almost every kind of bank.
he effectiveness of other types of regulation and supervision is
ffected by bank structure. Notably activity restrictions restrain
isk at large and foreign owned banks, while liquidity restrictions
ave the strongest impact on unlisted and commercial banks.
hese results confirm the findings of Laeven and Levine (2009)
nd Klomp and de Haan (2012) that bank structure conditions
he impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk.
hereas these studies focused (mostly) on advanced countries,
ur research focuses on developing and emerging countries in
iew of differences in institutional development of advanced and
ess advanced countries.
ppendix  A.  Supplementary  data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
ound, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.
015.11.001.
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